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Operations Research 
BY JOSEPH F . MCCLOSKEY 
Director of Operations Research, Chicago Office 
Presented at luncheon meeting of clients and friends of 
Haskins & Sells' Honolulu office, Honolulu—November 1958 
WHILE the United Kingdom was building radar into its home defenses during the summer of 1939, it encountered technical 
problems. These it sought to solve by assigning scientists and en-
gineers directly to the radar sites. Before long, these specialists 
were able to turn their attention from the question of how well the 
radar was working to the question of how well it was being used. 
Before the end of 1940, they had proved their worth in this latter 
activity to such an extent that groups were formed to do similar work 
for all of the military services of the United Kingdom. 
Because these groups worked on operational problems, because 
they reported to the operational sections of the various military 
staffs, and because they had opened up an essentially new field of 
inquiry, their efforts were given the. name operational research. The 
idea spread to the U . S. military late in 1941 under the name 
operations research. 
They analyzed weapons systems, tactical systems, and even some 
strategic systems. (You will note the emphasis on the word systems.) 
They looked for interactions or cause-effect relationships that would 
provide deeper insight into and greater understanding of the systems 
under study. This made possible better policies, better decisions, 
and better control of military operations. 
EXAMPLE 1: SEA-MINING OF JAPAN 
The sea-mining of Japan toward the end of World War II was 
one of the most important and most successful of these studies. 
Some scientists at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory who were 
then involved in the de-gaussing program turned their attention to 
the offensive use of mines late in 1941. It is important to realize that 
our Navy then regarded the mine as a defensive weapon for protect-
ing harbors and the like. These men analyzed the German use of 
mines and came to the conclusion that they could be used offensively 
in a number of contexts, but most effectively against an insular people 
—as the Germans were using them against Britain. 
Pearl Harbor occurred about then and this served to focus atten-
tion on Japan as a target for this type of offensive. The strategy, 
333 
tactics, and weapons were all worked out: the numbers and types of 
ships and their dispositions; the approaches, patterns, and techniques 
for laying the mines; the type, configuration, and fuzing of the mines. 
These analyses showed that the ships and tactics presented few prob-
lems, but that new developments in mines were required. 
These analyses attracted some attention—to the extent that a 
mine-warfare Operations Research group was established in Naval 
Operations and, more important in terms of time, the new mine de-
velopments were started. This was a major development that would 
require nearly three precious years to complete. 
Toward the end of 1944, the mines were ready to be put into 
production and our position in the Western Pacific was such that 
implementation of the plan could be considered. By that time, how-
ever, it was apparent that the B-29 was a more appropriate vehicle 
than a surface ship. Whether by accident or design, the man most 
responsible for the entire concept was assigned as Naval liaison with 
General Curtis LeMay. 
General LeMay's Operations Analysis Section (which did opera-
tions research for him) had its own problems at that time. The B-29 
engines required excessive maintenance and were contributing more 
than their share to an excessive loss rate. Operations analysis showed 
that much of this difficulty was attributable to overheating in climb-
ing to the high altitudes then used in bombing Japan and to the fuel 
consumed in rendezvousing. Further investigation showed that there 
was a low-level "hole" in Japan's antiaircraft defenses. 
The Navy and the A i r Force co-operated nicely on this one, and 
together the two groups of operations researchers convinced General 
LeMay that low-level night bombing by single aircraft would in-
crease bombs on target, reduce ditching losses, and reduce maintenance 
requirements. The net gain in available and effective aircraft would 
make possible the sustained bombing effort and the sea-mining of 
the Japanese inland waters. 
The bombing tactics were changed—with the expected results. 
The mine-warfare plan was reworked to use the B-29s. The mines 
went into production and the crews went into training. The pieces 
fell into place in March 1945. About ten per cent of the B-29 effort 
went into the mining of waters from Singapore to the home islands. 
When the war ended, the Japanese themselves gave sea mining 
equal credit with aerial bombardment for bringing their war machine 
to impotence by the time the coups de grace were administered at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
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Not all operations research in World War II was so spectacular, 
successful, or on such a grand scale. But the over-all contribution to 
victory was such that operations research became a formal and per-
manent part of the postwar service establishments of the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF NON-MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH 
In a very real sense, Britain's war continued when hostilities 
ceased—and the scientists who had contributed to military victory 
were asked to try their hand in the uphill economic battle facing the 
Empire. They again contributed heavily to victory and thus opera-
tional research first donned mufti in Britain. Civilian clothes, for one 
reason and another, did not prove as comfortable in the United States 
and Canada. In fact, non-military operations research got nowhere 
in North America until 1951—at least as a recognized activity under 
the name of operations research. 
EXAMPLE 2: A MAIL-ORDER HOUSE 
Actually, some very interesting industrial work had been done— 
by two men who had never heard of operations research. Their work, 
and that of others since, is the source of my favorite definition of 
operations research: It is what happens when people trained in the 
methods of the physical sciences turn their attention to a business problem. 
Thus, a mathematician working for a mail-order house in the 1920s 
and for two different department stores in the 1930s and 1940s was 
doing what later came to be called operations research. In the mail-
order case, where profits were affected to the extent of $40,000 for 
each change of one per cent in unclaimed (C.O.D.) returns, he was 
able to determine the economic limit on the courses of action the 
company could take to reduce the percentage of returns. In other 
words, he determined an optimum that was significantly higher than 
the minimum possible percentage of returns because a minimum-
return policy would have been as inimical to profits as a much higher 
percentage of returns. 
EXAMPLE 3: FOOD-PROCESSING 
The second man to whom I referred above is a climatologist. 
He went to work for an integrated food-processing company as an 
adviser on supplemental irrigation. It happened that he arrived to 
take up his duties just as the farm managers were mobilizing for the 
harvest of the pea crop, about June 1, 1946. He observed two phe-
nomena that made his intended assignment look rather pale on the 
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economic scale. First, there were about 600 transient laborers stand-
ing idle—and getting into trouble in the local community—waiting 
for the pea-harvesting to begin. Second, when the harvest started, 
the capacity of the freezing plant was soon overtaken and about one-
third of the total crop had to be diverted to the cannery. 
From these observations, it appeared to him that there should be 
a better way of scheduling the harvest. This meant there was a need 
for a better way of predicting the maturity date of the pea crop. So, 
he started to grow peas. He observed a wide variation among the 
growth period printed on the seed bags, the growth period experienced 
over the years on the farms, and the growth period that he experi-
enced in his experimental garden. He continued to grow peas, re-
gardless of season, and soon could plot the seasonal variation in growth 
rate. But he needed some measure that would make as much sense 
on the vertical scale of his graphs as the days of the year made on the 
horizontal scale. 
Here the pea plant came to his rescue. He observed a marked reg-
ularity in the growth pattern: Regardless of the age of a given pea 
plant, its rate of nodular development is identical with the rate of 
nodular development of every other pea plant. Furthermore, each 
variety of pea was ready for harvest at a specific point in its nodular 
development. For example, the Alaska pea is mature (in the com-
mercial sense) when it has developed 16.8 nodes, while Glaciers are 
ready for harvest at 17.2 nodes. 
Armed with these facts, our man could construct a climatic cal-
endar with pea nodes as the vertical scale and could predict very ac-
curately the date on which a pea plant, sown at any earlier date, would 
mature. This completed the basic research. How could the results 
be applied? 
First, the daily tonnage throughput of the freezing plant was 
determined from records. Then the average tonnage yield per acre 
for the various strains of pea was determined. A n ideal harvesting 
schedule, in terms of plant capacity, was then constructed and, using 
the climatic calendar, the date on which each strain should be planted, 
and in which fields, was determined. This made for a very irregular 
planting schedule because a one-day difference in harvest date in June 
could mean nine or ten days difference in planting date in March. 
Once again, the peas co-operated. By juggling the strains to take 
advantage of their different nodes-to-maturity, a compact planting 
schedule could be worked out. The variations in the weather, which 
had no effect on sequence, were built into the system. 
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The system was worked out in time for a large-scale experimental 
planting in the Spring of 1949. The experiment was so successful 
that the system could be extended to the whole farm (about 7,000 
acres in peas) in 1950. 
The general results to be expected from using the system had, 
of course, been predicted, but some completely unexpected results 
also emerged: 
• The peas behaved as predicted and the harvest was nicely 
spaced. 
• The daily throughput of the plant coincided with the amount 
of peas that could be harvested in one twelve-hour day with 
existing equipment. 
This eliminated: 
The diversion of peas to the cannery. 
The need for a second shift of harvesters, which had hitherto 
been comprised of the 600 transients. 
The sociological problem that the transients had created 
in the community. 
• Because the peas were picked at exactly the right time, quality-
control problems were reduced to negligible proportions and 
development of equipment for sorting non-freezable peas 
could be stopped. 
• Smoothing of the schedule through the freezing plant reduced 
congestion and had the effect of increasing capacity by more 
than ten per cent with no additional capital investment. 
• A l l crops could be scheduled in the same way by using the 
pea plant as the measuring stick. (The harvest date of peren-
nial-plant crops could also be predicted so that space could 
be provided in the schedule for them. You may be interested 
to know that this same researcher is consulted each year be-
fore the final dates for the annual Cherry Blossom festival 
are set in Washington.) 
There was one adverse unexpected result. During the first 
full year of operation under the system, some 93 per cent of the pea 
crop qualified as Grade 1. Unfortunately, there was a Grade 1 market 
for only about 22 per cent of the crop. As a result, many purchasers 
of second-grade peas got first-grade peas that year and the food-
processing company lost the differential in tonnage. This was cor-
rected the next year: The harvest schedule was moved back a few 
hours to give the peas a chance to get a little larger, thus throwing 
the desired percentage into the lower grades. 
337 
It is interesting to note that the research man concerned first 
learned about operations research during that first full year of opera-
tion under the new system. He had, in effect, regarded the planting, 
harvesting, processing cycle as a closed system and had failed to 
go beyond to market requirements. It is interesting to speculate (and 
we have done so several times) whether or not he would have included 
the market aspect in his original system had he known beforehand 
of the whole-system approach of operations research. 
EXAMPLE 4: A MACHINE-TOOL MANUFACTURER 
This whole-system approach stands out clearly in a study done 
in 1951-52 which helped to "sell" operations research to U . S. 
industry. 
A machine-tool manufacturer felt that in-process inventory was 
too high. The professor of operations research who investigated 
this problem for him was given "academic freedom" to pursue the 
problem in a completely systematic manner. He started by plotting 
flows of information and processing in order to get an over-all view 
of what was involved. This resulted in an organization chart that 
had immediate value in the management-training program. 
More importantly, the chart showed one very good reason why 
so many machine tools could not be shipped on schedule because 
they lacked one or two parts of being complete. The chart showed 
that, while orders for new equipment went through a very careful 
production-planning process, orders for replacement parts for ma-
chines in service were processed directly and led to withdrawals 
of parts of which the production planner had no knowledge. Co-
ordination of these two sources of demand on parts led to rapid 
shrinkage of incomplete machines, thus freeing significant amounts 
of working capital and space. 
Then the in-process inventory was looked at. It turned out that 
the company was placing too high a value on the cost of obsolescence 
and of carrying inventory and was not considering all of the costs 
included in set-up. Proper balancing of these costs indicated that 
in-process inventory should be increased threefold (that is, three 
times as many parts should be made per setup). The factor of 
increase would have been smaller if new storage space had been 
required, but the space formerly occupied by nearly finished machine 
tools served nicely to handle the threefold increase in inventory. 
More important, this solved another problem: The company 
wanted to introduce a new product line as soon as absorption of 
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its backlog of Korean War orders for machine tools would permit. 
The machine time made available by reducing the number of setups 
gave the company the option of going into production on the new 
product line almost immediately (some time was required to fit the 
new run-lengths with the assembly schedule). 
Then the company wanted to know what minimum business it 
could expect in machine tools. In effect, it assumed that production 
during the Korean War had satisfied the market and that, at least 
for a time, the total business might consist of replacement parts and 
replacement of machine tools in service. 
Fortunately, the company had records of every machine tool it 
had ever sold, when worn-out or obsolete machines were replaced, 
and the dollar value of spares purchased for each machine in service. 
Thus, adjusting the dollars, a rough measure of the point at which 
maintenance costs justified replacement was obtained. This could 
not be translated into time directly, but it could be translated indi-
rectly by using the Federal Reserve Board index of durable goods 
production. Thus, no "answer" on minimum business could be pro-
vided, but a reliable procedure, using the F R B index, was devised 
to make possible prediction of replacement business for fairly long 
future periods. Moreover, this analysis showed that the expected 
life of the machine tools was increasing steadily as improvements 
were incorporated. The sales department was delighted with this 
"mathematical proof" of something it had been claiming all along. 
S O M E C O N C L U S I O N S 
With these examples as background, perhaps we can reach some 
conclusions about operations research. 
First, we can see what happened when men trained in the 
methods of the physical sciences tackled the business problems in 
these examples, which may be multiplied manyfold. Thus, we can 
say that operations research is the application of the scientific method 
to management problems. 
Second, we have seen limited problems of some complexity and 
large problems of considerable complexity attacked by these methods. 
In each case, something unknown about the business (such as the 
growth characteristics of the pea) or some unrealized interactions 
within the business (such as those among demand, productive ca-
pacity, inventory, obsolescence, and costs) had to be discovered; in 
other words, some fairly fundamental research into the business was 
required. 
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Third, as operations research has matured, the systematic ap-
proach to business problems lends meaning to the whole-system con-
cept. This does not imply simultaneous solution of all problems, but 
it does imply that the effect of a new policy or a new procedure on 
related areas of the business will be realized, thus reducing the danger 
of "disruption by improvement"—as happens, for example, when in-
ventory is reduced arbitrarily in order to improve working-capital 
position, but at the cost of customer dissatisfaction, increased produc-
tion costs, disrupted vendor relationships, and employment instability. 
Finally, while it is not emphasized in the examples given, there is 
the concept of the mixed team. We all know that research takes consid-
erable time. We all have valid doubts about the ability of some scientist 
to come in and tell us anything new about a business with which 
we have lived all of our adult lives. In operations research, the mixed 
team puts more men on the job to reduce the time, but, more important, 
it combines ability to do the kind of research required with knowledge 
of the business. Thus a scientist can develop the mathematical equa-
tions and solve them, but he needs people thoroughly versed in the 
business, like accountants and industrial engineers, for example, to 
help him determine what should go into the equations and what the 
solution to the equations may mean in practical terms. 
This then, is operations research. I wish there were more time 
to unravel some of the "mystery" that has come to surround this 
relatively new approach to management problems. Perhaps you have 
some quesions that will enable me to clear up some additional points. 
Thank you. 
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